

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-19 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1310

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY

USLO PEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 4953

DEPT POUCH AMEMBASSY SUVA

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DISARMAMENT: FIRST COMMITTEE VOTING ON COMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN RESOLUTIONS

REF: (A) USUN 4478; (B) USUN 4521; (C) USUN 4765

1. SUMMARY: THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON NOV 15 ADOPTED THE
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MEXICAN AND CANADIAN COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS.
(SEE REFTELS FOR TEXTS). NO NUCLEAR POWER VOTED FOR EITHER RES.
THE MEXICAN DRAFT, WHICH CONDEMNED IN STRONG TERMS ALL
NUCLEAR TESTS WHETHER ABOVE OR BELOW GROUND, WAS ADOPTED

BY A VOTE OF 92 IN FAVOR, 5 OPPOSED, AND 27 ABSTAINING. SUPPORT CAME PRINCIPALLY FROM THE NON-ALIGNED, CHINA AND FRANCE WERE AMONG THOSE OPPOSED, AND THE US, UK, USSR, JAPAN, AND MOST NATO COUNTRIES ABSTAINED. CANADIAN DRAFT WAS MORE MODERATE IN ITS TREATMENT OF UNDERGROUND TESTING THAN MEXICAN RES BUT, AS A RESULT OF PRESSURES FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, THE RESOLUTION CALLED ON STATES CONDUCTING TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE TO HALT SUCH TESTS IMMEDIATELY. FRENCH DEL LOBBIED EXTENSIVELY AGAINST RES, ESPECIALLY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WHICH INSISTED ON IMMEDIATE HALT TO ATMOSPHERIC TESTS, ARGUING THAT RES TAKES A RELATIVELY LENIENT STAND ON UNDERGROUND TESTS WHILE SINGLING OUT ATMOSPHERIC TESTS FOR SPECIAL CENSURE. PARAGRAPH CONSIDERED PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE BY FRANCE WAS ADOPTED SEPARATELY, BUT DID NOT RECEIVE MAJORITY OF VOTES CAST. (58-6-55). RES AS A WHOLE WAS APPROVED 67-7-60). SUPPORT CAME FROM NON-ALIGNED AND PACIFIC REGION STATES, CHINA AND FRANCE VOTED NO, AND US, UK, USSR AND MANY ARAB AND FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN STATES ABSTAINED. LARGE NUMBER OF ABSTENTIONS APPEARED ATTRIBUTABLE NOT ONLY TO FRENCH TIES WITH FORMER COLONIES AND FRENCH MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BUT ALSO TO GROWING IMPATIENCE WITH SLOW RATE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A CTB. EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE PROVIDED OCCASION FOR BITTER EXCHANGE BETWEEN CHINESE AND SOVIET DELS. END SUMMARY

2. OF THE TWO CTB RESOLUTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE, THE MEXICAN RES (SEE USUN 4478 FOR TEXT) WAS THE MORE INTEMPERATE IN TONE AND EXTREME IN SUBSTANCE. IT CONDEMNED "WITH THE UTMOST VIGOUR" ALL NUCLEAR TESTS, ASSERTED THAT DIFFERENCES ON THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION WERE NOT A VALID REASON FOR DELAYING CTB, AND URGED NUCLEAR POWERS TO HALT ALL TESTS "WITHOUT DELAY." EITHER THROUGH PERMANENT AGREEMENT OR UNILATERAL OR AGREED MORATORIA. SUPPORTERS OF THIS RES REGARDED IT AS A CONCISE AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT CONDEMNING AT ONCE AND WITH EQUAL FORCE BOTH UNDERGROUND AND ATMOSPHERIC TESTS. IT WAS ADOPTED BY ROLL CALL VOTE OF 92 IN FAVOR, 5 AGAINST, AND 27 ABSTAINING. (1972 MEXICAN CTB RES, WHICH WAS SIMILAR CONFIDENTIAL

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TO 1973 VERSION, WAS ADOPTED 81-4-30 IN FIRST COMMITTEE.)

3. AFFIRMATIVE VOTES FOR RES CAME PRINCIPALLY FROM NON-ALIGNED, INCLUDING SWEDEN AND YUGOSLAVIA, AS WELL AS FROM SEVERAL PACIFIC STATES SUCH AS AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WHICH ALSO CO-SPONSORED CANADIAN RESOLUTION. ALBANIA, CHINA, FRANCE, GABON, AND PORTUGAL CAST NEGATIVE VOTES. AMONG THOSE ABSTAINING WERE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES, US, UK AND MOST OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, AND JAPAN. (DENMARK, NORWAY AND CANADA SUPPORTED RES, ALTHOUGH CANADA, IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, INDICATED IT HAD MISGIVINGS CONCERNING TREATMENT OF VERIFICATION IN RES; JAPAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, SAID IT WAS ABSTAINING SINCE RES DID NOT ACCORD WITH ITS VIEWS ON NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.)

4. CANADA WAS THE CHIEF SPONSOR AND COORDINATOR OF THE OTHER DRAFT CTB RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY AN ATTEMPT TO MARRY THE VIEWPOINTS OF THE SPONSORS OF LAST YEAR'S MODERATE AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND RES (WHICH THE US SUPPORTED) WITH THOSE OF THE SPONSORS OF THE SOMEWHAT STRONGER CANADIAN RES OF 1972 (ON WHICH THE US ABSTAINED.) THIS YEAR, HOWEVER, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, PARTICULARLY THE LATTER, PROVED TO BE THE MOST EXTREME OF THE RESOLUTION'S FIVE PRINCIPAL CO-SPONSORS (CANADA, SWEDEN, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND). PARTIALLY AS A RESULT OF STRONG DOMESTIC REACTIONS TO FRENCH TESTS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, BOTH PRESSED FOR STRONG, CONDEMNATORY LANGUAGE ON ATMOSPHERIC TESTING. CANADIAN DELOFFS TOLD US ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT THEY HAD TO WORK HARD TO PREVENT THE RESOLUTION FROM TAKING A STILL MORE RADICAL TURN AND THAT PERSISTENT PRESSURES FROM THEIR CO-SPONSORS FOR MORE EXTREME FORMULATIONS GAVE THEM LITTLE FLEXIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE US AND OTHER DELS WHICH SOUGHT A MORE MODERATE RESOLUTION.

5. ONE OF THE NOTABLE FEATURES OF THIS YEAR'S TEST BAN DEBATE WAS THE APPARENT LACK OF CONCERN OR DESIRE AMONG THE SPONSORS FOR FINDING A RESOLUTION WHICH AT LEAST SOME OF THE NUCLEAR POWERS COULD SUPPORT. IN A FIRST COMMITTEE SPEECH THE NEW ZEALAND REP REBUTTED A UK STATEMENT THAT, IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE, A TEST BAN RES SHOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF AT LEAST SOME NUCLEAR POWERS. HE SAID THAT IN THE PAST SPONSORS HAVE TAILORED RESOLUTIONS TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF
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NUCLEAR POWERS, ONLY TO SEE THESE MORE MODERATE RESOLUTIONS DISREGARDED BY THOSE SAME POWERS. THIS YEAR, THE NEW ZEALAND REP SAID THE CO-SPONSORS WOULD ONLY ADAPT THEIR RES TO SUIT NUCLEAR POWERS IF ALL FIVE WOULD VOTE FOR IT AND IF ASSURANCES WERE PROVIDED THAT MEASURABLE PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RES WOULD BE MADE DURING 1974. LATER, IN PRIVATE, AMB BARTON (CANADA) TOLD US THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE CO-SPONSORS WOULD MODIFY THE RESOLUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMMITMENT BY THE US AND USSR TO SERIOUS CTB NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE NEXT YEAR.

6. THE RES WHICH EMERGED FROM NUMEROUS BARGAINING SESSIONS AMONG THE CO-SPONSORS WAS, AT LEAST IN ITS TREATMENT OF UNDERGROUND TESTING, Milder than the MEXICAN RES, BUT SOMEWHAT MORE EXHORTATORY THAN THE CANADIAN RES OF LAST YEAR. THE OPERATIVE PARA CONCERNED SPECIFICALLY WITH UNDERGROUND TESTS "VIGOROUSLY URGES" THE CCD, ESPECIALLY THE NUCLEAR POWERS THERE, "IMMEDIATELY TO START NEGOTIATIONS" ON A CTB.

NOTE BY OCT: POUCHED SUVA.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-19 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00

DODE-00 EA-11 EUR-25 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-10 OIC-04 SPC-03 PA-04 PRS-01

RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 DRC-01 PCH-02 /212 W

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R 210215Z NOV 73

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1311

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 4953

DEPT POUCH AMEMBASSY SUVA

DISTO

7. THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL ASPECT OF THE RESOLUTION TURNED OUT TO BE OP PARA 3 WHICH "INSISTS THAT THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES WHICH HAVE BEEN CARRYING OUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE DISCONTINUE SUCH TESTS FORTHWITH." THE CO-SPONSORS, POINTING TO OP PARAS 1 AND 2 WHICH EXPRESS DEEP CONCERN RE ATMOSPHERIC AND UNDERGROUND TESTS AND URGE THE END OF TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS, MAINTAINED THAT THE RES WAS BALANCED IN ITS INTENTION TO HALT TESTS ABOVE AND BELOW CONFIDENTIAL

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GROUND, BUT INSISTED THAT IT WAS REASONABLE TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE END TO ATMOSPHERIC TESTING IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY AND THE FACT THAT ATMOSPHERIC TESTING POLLUTES THE ATMOSPHERE. ON THESE AND RELATED ISSUES, FIJI DEL ENGAGED IN PARTICULARLY STRONG

AND EMOTIONAL EXCHANGES WITH FRENCH DEL.

8. THE FRENCH DEL ENERGETICALLY LOBBIED AGAINST THE RES, ESPECIALLY OP PARA 3, CALLING IT DISCRIMINATORY AND HYPOCRITICAL BECAUSE IT TREATED ATMOSPHERIC AND UNDERGROUND TESTING IN TWO DIFFERENT WAYS. THOSE STATES UNABLE TO TEST UNDERGROUND TO ENSURE THEIR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS WERE BEING DIRECTED TO STOP ATMOSPHERIC TESTS "FORTHWITH," WHILE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS WHICH, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROMOTING THE ARMS RACE AND FOR PROVOKING OTHER POWERS TO TEST, WERE ONLY BEING ASKED TO CARRY OUT NEGOTIATIONS. THUS, THE RES SEEMED TO CONDONE FURTHER UNDERGROUND TESTS. IN A SERIES OF WELL-ORCHESTRATED EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE, SEVERAL FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN STATES ECHOED FRENCH SENTIMENTS, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO OP PARA 3.

9. OP PARA 3 WAS APPROVED IN A SEPARATE VOTE, BUT FAILED TO OBTAIN A MAJORITY OF ALL VOTES CAST (58 IN FAVOR, 6 OPPOSED, 55 ABSTAINING). THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE WAS ADOPTED BY 67-7-50. (THE 1972 CANADIAN CTB RES, WHICH SIMILARLY CALLED ON NUCLEAR POWERS "IMMEDIATELY TO UNDERTAKE UNILATERAL OR NEGOTIATED MEASURES" WAS APPROVED BY 94-4-28). SUPPORT FOR THE RES CAME PRIMARILY FROM THE NON-ALIGNED, PACIFIC REGION STATES, AND A FEW NATO OR WESTERN COUNTRIES (CANADA, DENMARK, ICELAND, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS). VOTING NO WERE ALBAINA, CHINA, FRANCE, GABON, PORTUGAL, SAUID ARABIA, AND SENEGAL. ABSTAINING WERE THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES, THE US, UK AND REMAINING NATO COUNTRIES, AND MOST ARAB AND FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN STATES. PARTICULARLY NOTABLE WERE THE 26 COUNTRIES (MOSTLY ARAB AND AFRICAN) WHICH EITHER ABSTAINED OR VOTED NO ON THE CANADIAN RES AFTER HAVING VOTED AFFIRMATIVELY ON THE MEXICAN RES.

10. A LARGE SHARE OF THE SUCCESS OF THE FRENCH LOBBYING EFFORT ON THE CANADIAN RES CAN PROBABLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO TRADITIONAL TIES BETWEEN FRANCE AND HER FORMER COLONIES AS
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WELL AS TO THE FRENCH POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT ANOTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENT CONTRIBUTING TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF ABSTENTIONS ON THE RES AND ON OP PARA 3 APPEARS TO BE A GROWING IMPATIENCE WITH THE SLOW RATE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A CTB. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT AFTER 10 YEARS OF FRUITLESS EFFORT SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE PARTIAL TEST BAN, THE "GRACE PERIOD" ON UNDERGROUND TESTING HAS ENDED. NO LONGER, ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW, SHOULD THE ATMPSHPERIC TESTERS BE SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL CONDEMNATION, WHILE THE UNDERGROUND TESTERS SHOW LITTLE INCLINATION TO PROCEED TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON A CTB. MOREOVER, THESE DELS ASSERT THAT UNDERGROUND TESTING BY THE SUPERPOWERS IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROMOTING THE "TECHNOLOGICAL ARMS RACE." EVEN SUCH MODERATE WESTERN STATES

AS THE NETHERLANDS VOICED SUCH AN OPINION. IN EXPLAINING THE DUTCH ABSTENTION ON OP PARA 3 OF THE CANADIAN RES, THE NETHERLANDS REP STATED THAT "UNDERGROUND TESTS -- WHICH ARE BY THE WAY MORE NUMEROUS THAN ATMOSPHERIC ONES -- ARE PERHAPS THE MORE DANGEROUS OF THE TWO TYPES BECAUSE TYE LEAD TO FURTHER SOPHISTICATION OF ALREADY EXCESSIVE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE MAJOR POWERS."

11. SINO-SOVIET EXCHANGE. IN HIS EXPLANATION OF VOTE, CHINESE REP (CHUANG) STATED FAMILAR JUSTIFICATION OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, ATTACKED THE PARTIAL TEST BAN AS A "FRAUD" PERPETRATED BY THE SUPERPOWERS (DEALING MORE HARSHLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAN WITH THE US, WHICH WAS NOT MENTIONED BY NAME) AND ASSERTED THAT CHINA WOULD NOT STOP NUCLEAR TESTS BEFORE THE COMPLETE PROHIBITION AND THOROUGH DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN RESPONSE, AMB ROSHCHIN (USSR) REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF CHINESE NEGATIVE VOTES ON GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS AND CHINA'S FAILURE TO ADHERE TO EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THE PARTIAL TEST BAN AND THE NPT. THIS ELICITIED A FURTHER COUNTER-ATTACK FROM THE CHINESE, AND FURTHER REBUTTAL FROM THE SOVIETS.
BENNETT

NOTE BY OCT: POUCHED SUVA.
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GENEVA
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